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ABSTRACT: Who is the author? Is it God, the state, human nature, the artist or simply 
a discourse that philosophers have indulged in the fallacious presumption that there is 
essence or being beyond the flux of things? Or is God just the possibility of 
understanding, wherein the reader is able to enter into a dialogue with the author/other? 
I‟ve not tried to conclude the argument in any significant sense because the question 
regarding the supposed identity of the author precludes any attempt to close the 
discussion. That‟s a Wittgensteinean stance: you present an argument in order to move 
the debate to the unexplored aspects of the question rather than resolve the question 
once and for all. This stance has a Dostoyeskyean dimension to it: belief exists at the end 
of skepticism. To both, Wittgenstein and Dostoyevsky, understanding is a consequence 
to the experience of doubt. The rejection of essence complements the essentiality 
inherent in faith. This is neither a Chomskyean viewpoint wherein the linguist knows for 
certain through scientific reasoning that language is an aspect of human nature nor is it 
the Derridean point that deconstructs the question in order to dismantle any essential 
attempt to understand the other.  
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Ivan has no God. He has an idea. 
                                 Dostoyevsky - The Brothers Karamazov 
 
They all desire the death of their fathers. 
                                 Dostoyevsky - The Brothers Karamazov 
 
What makes hatred of the father unacceptable is fear of the father; castration is terrible, 
whether as punishment or as the price of love. 
                                 Sigmund Freud - "Dostoyevsky and Parricide" 
 
Fyodor Pavlovitch: You never judge me! 
Alexey Karamazov: God will judge you. 
Fyodor Pavlovitch: God will also understand me. 
- from the movie version of The Brothers Karamazov 
 
1. The idea of/as the author 
 
What is common to Wittgenstein, Chomsky, and Derrida is the importance of language 
as an area concealed with the possibility of change in an ethical as well as political sense. 
Ivan has an idea, i.e., he can arrive by means of syntax to a perspective from where he 
can logically undermine authority, simply by disagreeing with any complacent notion 
regarding the existence of a supreme being based on mere faith: “No, there is no God” 
(Dostoyevsky, 1948: 135). Sartre substantiates Ivan‟s contention in Existentialism and 
Human Emotions:  
 
Nowhere is it written that the Good exists, that we must be honest, that we must not 
lie; because the fact is we are on a plane where there are only men. Dostoyevsky said, 
“If God didn‟t exist, everything would be possible”1. That is the very starting point of 
existentialism. Indeed everything is permissible if God does not exist, and as a result 
man is forlorn, because neither within him nor without does he find anything to cling to 
(Sartre, 1957: 22).  
 
The baffling simplicity of Ivan‟s contention that anything is possible in the absence of a 
superior power makes him relevant to the discussion regarding authori-cide. 
 From Ivan's point of view that one can have an idea rather than God, it becomes 
possible to read Wittgenstein, Chomsky and Derrida. This implies two things: one is that 
there is an authority that is not a mere idea and another is that ideas could act as 
disrupters of authority. Unlike Sartre, to whom the “idea” germinates in the absence of 
an author, to Plato, the idea (as the original being) is the author; goodness is the essence 
that precedes the existence of language. The metaphor of the sun in the Book VI of the 
Republic substantiates the notion of goodness. “This reality, then, that gives their truth to 
the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the 
                                                 
1Perhaps Sartre is referring to the particular passage in The Brothers Karamazov, when Mitya is talking to 
Alexey about Ivan‟s atheism: “It‟s God that‟s worrying me. That‟s the only thing that‟s worrying me. What 
if he doesn‟t exist? What if Rakitin‟s right –that it‟s an idea made up by men? Then, if he doesn‟t exist, 
man is the chief of the earth, of the universe. Magnificent! Only how is he going to be good without God? 
That‟s the question . . . For whom is man going to love then? To whom will he be thankful? To whom will 
he sing the hymn?” (Dostoyevsky, 1948: 626-7). 
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idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in 
so far as known” (Plato, 1946: 744). Along the lines of the Sartrean view of anything 
being possible in the realm of ideas (perhaps even viewing the author as mere idea) and 
the Platonic view of the author as the idea which makes possible a world of objects, a 
discussion occurs between the author as maker of language and language as the space to 
explore what is possible, rather than one authority that allows the author to be a unified 
subject. 
 The premise of the Platonic assumption is that the author is the central figure of 
metaphysics, the metaphysician or the truth-doctor who is empowered to cure the 
disease of lie. To investigate the reality of the author is to investigate the presence of 
objects in the world. If objects are not real then what is the “real”? Arthur S. Eddington 
in his book The Nature of the Physical World furthers the discussion when he speaks of the 
two tables before him; one is the substantial table that is open to simple, commonsensical 
observation and another is a scientific table that is nothing but emptiness (Eddington, 
1929: ix-x). As Eddington expresses in the chapter “Science and Mysticism”,  
 
We have torn away the mental fancies to get at the reality beneath, only to find that the 
reality of that which is beneath is bound up with its potentiality of awakening these 
fancies. It is because the mind, the weaver of illusion, is also the only guarantor of 
reality that reality is always to be sought at the base of illusion (Eddington, 1929: 319).  
 
When Dr. Johnson tells Boswell “I refute it thus”, –while referring to “Bishop Berkeley‟s 
ingenious sophistry to prove the existence of matter, and that everything in the universe 
is merely ideal” (Boswell, 1953: 333) - by kicking a rock, the refutation itself can be seen 
as an attribution of reality to the presence of the rock. The rock is the essence of what 
Derrida terms as “Western metaphysics”. While Johnson aims a kick at metaphysics, he 
falls into the trap of suggesting that there is reality outside perception and language is 
instrumental in connecting perception and the rock in question.  
 To Wittgenstein, the question is: can a world exist without objects in it? Is there 
another world outside perception or is language embodied in perception impinging upon 
the material world? Wittgenstein does not avoid the question of the real but instead says 
that, “Doubting and non-doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the 
second” (Wittgenstein, 1969: 46). When one acknowledges the spatiality of objects, that 
objects possess being (not in the sense of either life or even perception) but merely 
space which endows objects with an in-built possibility of movement (when the 
scientific table becomes the substantial table and vice versa the mind moving from the 
ordinary to the poetic and mystical), then it is possible to understand that perception and 
phenomena are not only bound by language but in an essential region outside language. “It 
is the essence of philosophy not to depend on experience, and this is what is meant by 
saying that philosophy is a priori” (Wittgenstein, 1979: 97). In the absence of experience, 
one could learn philosophy solely by asking questions.  
Russell, in his introduction to the Tractatus captures the dynamic of 
Wittgenstein‟s mysticism in saying that 
 
[…] every language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, in the 
language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with the 
structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that to this 
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hierarchy of languages there may be no limit . . .  The totalities concerning which Mr. 
Wittgenstein holds that it is impossible to speak logically are nevertheless thought by 
him to exist, and are the subject-matter of his mysticism (Wittgenstein, 1961: XXII). 
  
The notion of totalities that cannot be logically spoken about is a possibility that has to 
be seen as the possibility of a totality, even if one is unwilling to enter into a serious 
discussion regarding the status of the totality. In a way, this answers the question of why 
use is more important than the real existence of objects. Use, perhaps, is one way of 
acknowledging the function of objects, rather than their existence, in strictly material 
terms. Correspondingly, the question of whether objects exist or not in real terms is 
immaterial to a discussion on language. The question of knowing language is a value-based 
decision above everything else:  
 
I know that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. - 
That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a 
certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief . . . But doesn‟t it come out 
here that knowledge is related to a decision? (Wittgenstein, 1969: 47).  
 
The ultimate question of reality remains “ultimate” because of its elusiveness. As 
important as indicating language by means of values is to define value as an indicator of 
language. 
 In the importance that he places on values, which pertain to decision-making 
“It‟s a good thing I don‟t allow myself to be influenced!” (Wittgenstein, 1980: 1). 
Wittgenstein, as much as a philosopher, is a literary artist in a significant sense. That 
philosophy can be studied as literature goes against the conventional view that identifies 
the discourse of philosophy as different from the language of other disciplines. As 
Wittgenstein ironically says, “People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct 
them, poets, musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach 
them–that does not occur to them” (Wittgenstein, 1980: 36).  
 Unlike Wittgenstein, Chomsky‟s theory of language as competence has an 
explicitly political purpose in view in the way it opposes anarchy to authority; it almost 
seems that Chomsky shares Plato‟s view of the poets in Book X of the Republic; literature 
is isolated or survives apart from the rational part in the human mind. Logically this 
implies that there is a language of reason, just as there is a reasonable mechanism 
(functioning on the principles of reason) in the human brain that makes language 
possible in a human being and the mechanism stands apart from a work of art that is 
purely based on the performance of individuals. This assertion is concomitant to what 
D‟Agostino points out in “Chomsky‟s Mentalism and Rationalism” that  
 
Language-users are capable of making a potentially infinite number of assertions about 
their language. In a whole range of cases, for instance, language-users will, when 
queried, typically assert that a given string of words either is or is not an acceptable 
sentence of their language. These assertions are explicit manifestations of language-
users‟ propositional knowledge about their language (D‟Agostino, 1986: 82).  
 
In addition, the “propositional knowledge” or what can be known as language of reason 
is a fundamentally political instinct in terms of the individual, his or her relation to the 
group in which he or she lives, and the need to be free from external constraints to an 
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extent where he or she is free to obey the innate language mechanism that not only helps 
one come to terms with the art of communal living, but also empowers one to articulate 
his or her basic demand for a just and decent living based on egalitarian principles.  
 If goodness and learnability are at the basis of a child‟s nature–if the language of 
reason is something that a human child possesses merely by being one; first and 
foremost, this would be an ethical premise that Chomsky translates into political terms, 
rooted in a biological basis:  
 
The principles of mind provide the scope as well as the limits of human creativity. 
Without such principles, scientific understanding and creative acts would not be 
possible . . . In investigating some of the most familiar achievements of human 
intelligence--the ordinary use of language, for example–we are struck at once by the 
creative character of free creation within a system of rule (Chomsky, 1971: 50). 
 
One of the formidable implications of Chomsky‟s rule-based theory of competence is 
that language is the biological destiny of an individual capable of functioning creatively 
within a system. An individual must articulate in order to make survival feasible. In fact, 
it is merely competence as manifested in language that made the human being possible. 
As John Lyons points out,  
 
Chomsky maintains that it is only by assuming that a child is born with a knowledge of 
the highly restrictive principles of human grammar, and the predisposition to make use 
of them in analyzing the utterances he hears about him, that we can make any sense of 
the process of language learning . . . It is the child‟s inborn knowledge of the universal 
principles governing the structure of human language that supplies the deficiency in the 
empiricist account of language acquisition. These principles are part of what we call the 
“mind”, being represented in some way, no doubt, in the structure or mode of 
operation of the brain, and may be compared with the “innate ideas” of Descartes and 
the rationalist tradition going back to Plato (Lyons, 1977: 133). 
To Chomsky, for one to question the nature of authority is contrary to examining the 
source of the authority of human nature, i.e. language. It is the authority of nature that is 
a premise enabling one to analyze the real nature of authority. To Derrida, Chomsky‟s 
distinction of competence from performance would be one that is essentially based on 
différance; if language is a discourse of signs, then performance is closer home to a 
concept of linguistic perspectivism (viewing language as a point of view), rather than 
competence that seeks to assume a transcendental point (with a strong argument in 
favor of a scientific ground of language as a mental organ) outside the text which is a 
field of signs. Derrida might question Chomsky‟s view of language itself and its 
biological significance as simply being another discourse on the human body that is 
within the text. Language, in Derridean terms, can be defined as a series of 
performances. Philosophy is not just content, i.e., what it talks about, but also the 
language of presentation, i.e., the way it talks about something. The content of speech is 
as important as the way philosophy is written; by the way philosophers betray 
themselves through the act of writing in the concentration on speech or content. As 
Derrida notes in his interview to Houdebine from Positions,  
 
„Thought‟ (quotation marks: the words „thought‟ and what is called „thought‟) means 
nothing: it is the substantified void of a highly derivative ideality, the effect of a différance 
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of forces, the illusory autonomy of a discourse or a consciousness whose hypostasis is 
to be deconstructed, whose “causality” is to be analyzed, etc. First. Secondly, the 
sentence can be read thus: if there is thought–and there is, and it is just as suspect, for 
analogous critical reasons, to contest the authority of all „thought‟–then whatever will 
continue to be called thought, and which, for example, will designate the deconstruction 
of logocentrism, means nothing, for in the last analysis it no longer derives from 
„meaning‟. Wherever it operates, ‘thought’ means nothing (Derrida, 1981b: 49). 
 
If there is no thought and if a thinker is one who thinks about nothing, can an author (of 
philosophy) be a philosopher himself with a certain authority to profess a rather 
subjective truth as if it were an objective fact of life independent of other factors? The 
point of the apparently repetitive question is that philosophy is the history of authority2; the 
author of a literary text is not an isolated figure; he is a function of history and his 
centeredness is a reproduction of other social institutions, which include the church, the 
family and the state. He is a priest, father, statesman and writer too. If language is the 
field of the text, every other institution would automatically fall within its purview. This 
implies that the priest, father and statesman enunciate a particular philosophy that makes 
patriarchy a dominant discourse prevailing over alternate discourses of language, like, for 
instance, matriarchy (la langue, language of the mother as manifested in the woman-
mother as a point of dispersal). The alternate discourse can be understood when it is 
juxtaposed with the so-called dominant discourse. Language slips from position to 
position, from the dominant to the alternate and vice versa. A “pure” discussion of 
alternate discourses (like matriarchy) can turn metaphysical unless understood in the 
terms of various other discourses. In fact, the very discussion on discourse can be 
metaphysical unless one goes into the use of language.  
 
2. Understanding “understanding” 
 
 The Wittgensteinean point is that philosophy would be interpretation that finds 
meaning in use. “There may be a sense of  „understanding‟ in which the word refers to a 
state of mind which occurs while making a move in chess or while using a word . . . But 
there is also a sense in which „understanding a word‟ means knowing its use” 
(Wittgenstein, 1979: 49). If literature is identified with language, then there is a literature 
to every discipline. As language-users we are continuously saying one thing or the other 
and that‟s what makes us literary figures (who are always thinking about thought). 
“Thought strikes us as mysterious. But not while we think . . . It isn‟t while we‟re looking 
at it that it seems a strange process; but when we let ourselves be guided by language, 
when we look at what we say about it” (Wittgenstein, 1974: 154). We‟re not only saying, 
but are also looking at what we say. If language is a way of saying, literature is the use of 
saying for the manifold purposes of thought. It is a point of view, argument, metaphor 
and paradox. Every time an individual uses language, language acts as an interpreter 
between him/her and the objects that compose the world. Is there something outside 
                                                 
2A history of authority can be visualized as the history of proper names. For instance, unless the context is 
specified the name of the philosopher Socrates might easily be confused with the name of Lady Ottoline 
Morrell‟s dog “Socrates” since the word is the same. 
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the interpretation of language as language or the so-called meaning in use? That‟s a useless 
question because it exists outside the context of objects, but which can be posed, less in 
the anticipation of an answer, rather, in an attempt to visualize possibilities outside the 
text. Fyodor Pavlovitch‟s assumption that there is an understanding that surpasses man‟s 
judgment and that is able to look at him with compassion despite his utter degradation is 
based on this useless premise that questions the adequacy of the text to respond to the 
possibilities that exist on the margins of discourse. 
 To understand, in a hermeneutical sense, also means power. Far from being just 
the power of empathy (with obvious religious overtones), it is power that challenges, 
exposes and negates the reader from ever understanding the text in a comprehensive 
sense. This brings to book not “understanding” as a concept as much as the reader‟s 
ability to understand the text or the reader‟s innate linguistic competence.   
 
It is very hard to imagine concepts other than our own because we never become aware 
of certain very general facts of nature . . . Imagine someone who counts only on his 
fingers, for whom five is a hand and ten the whole person, and who then goes on to 
count people on his fingers, etc. For him the decimal system will not be an arbitrary 
number system. For him it is not a method of counting, but counting (Wittgenstein, 
1982: 31). 
 
To Chomsky, who subscribes to the Cartesian notion that a triangle being rooted in the 
brain would retain its triangularity irrespective of the dynamics of culture, the social 
order is a reproduction of the natural order. If human competence leads to the making 
of history, the competence itself is outside the language of history and is of interest to a 
historian of language or maybe a linguist. While a history of language might at best 
document the sources and events that lead to innate competence, it is the history of 
science or science that deals with competence; the science of language offers the 
biological bases to the existence of the language faculty in the brain. A science of 
language is also the science of grammar, i.e., the ability of the human child to make 
meaningful sentences in any language or learn another language. What makes this 
possible is the extraordinary premise that universal grammar is the basis of human 
language. 
 Understanding is also to state the truth; and an anarchist society is perhaps one 
of the consequences of such a truth on “the child‟s innate disposition to learn language 
of a certain type and to the linguist‟s account of this” (Chomsky, 1965: 25); but the truth 
itself can be logically observed because it is based on the positivist conclusion of the 
innateness of language. Such a premise of innateness endows the human being with a 
rationality that comes naturally with his/her capacity to make language.  
 To Derrida, the natural order is a construction of the social order, one among 
many, but one, which has become the dominant discourse in philosophy. The word 
natural has numerous historical associations, one of the most important being that of 
construction or the need to offer a causal relation which follows the connection and the 
text points to such a connectedness rather than deterministically verifying it to the 
reader. Understanding is construction. For one to understand “understanding,” one must 
undermine the premise on which understanding is constructed, both as concept and as 
means of approaching the other. Deconstruction is an alternative to understanding thus 
applying criticism as weapon to examine the authority to comprehend the text in a 
A CASE OF AUTHORI-CIDE
REVISTA FORMA VOL 05
ISSN 2013-7761 PRIMAVERA ‘12 
 100 
positivist manner. It functions like a “sponge that expunges the proper name, puts it 
outside of itself, effaces and loses it, soils it as well in order to make it into a common 
noun; it contaminates the common noun . . . But simultaneously, the sponge can also 
retain the name, absorb it, shelter it, and keep it within itself” (Derrida, 1984: 64).   
 One unexamined possibility is whether Wittgenstein is moving toward 
Chomsky‟s innateness when he says that “Logic is transcendental?” (Wittgenstein, 1961: 
65). Logic can be seen as the connectedness of the world, i.e., is the innate disposition to 
be, if being in turn is the ability to imagine the world. Logic is imagination that 
transcends the world. The logical disposition toward colors offers an instance of the 
function of imagination that makes the world possible. Rather than just the 
consciousness of being, it is the disposition to cognize the world in terms of 
transcendental logic that belongs to a person.  
 From the Chomskyean point of view, the human brain, not unlike the computer, 
which would be an apt metaphor, is a data-processing mechanism and one of the sub-
mechanisms like the visual system in the language acquisition device (or the LAD). Far 
from being constructed, the LAD is a natural device that has evolved through time. One 
implication of this assertion is that the brain is identified as constant and any attempt to 
correlate it to mind is unscientific. Chomsky translates a philosophical Cartesian notion 
of innateness to a scientific fact where language becomes evident through the workings 
of the human brain in a social order. What is not beyond dispute is the means of 
knowing experimentally if such a device actually exists in the absence of the given form 
of a society.  
 To Wittgenstein, the authority of the mind displaces the authority of the brain. 
“A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it” (Wittgenstein, 1961: 19). Words 
are pictures of reality. A word is an object because it occupies space on a page; it also 
exists in the air in a state of articulation. It both has and does not have a physical quality 
to it. In the context of the latter, a word exists in a mental space rooted in a social 
context. It makes sense or meaning. From a physicist‟s point of view, if the world is a 
picture of emptiness, i.e., visually unpictureable electrons simultaneously moving in all 
directions, then language is a picture of the mental model that goes into the making of 
the world.   
 To Derrida, the mind/brain dichotomy is a construction imposed on the 
“reality” of the world. Chomsky‟s attempt to give to the Cartesian notion of the mind 
biological basis in human language is as much a construction as Wittgenstein‟s attempt 
to attribute transcendentality to logic. The attempt to discover a positive foundation of 
authority is the essence of metaphysics since the authority invested in the question of 
origins has a patriarchal basis to it. Deconstructing authority is to disprivilege the 
traditional opposition between reality and metaphysics (since one is the other). This does 
not mean that the futile search for the author undermines authority itself from being. 
On the contrary, Derrida‟s différance is the displacement of authority from a 
transcendental position of dominance to a point of view; language as a system of signs. 
As Spivak points out in her “Translator‟s Preface” to Of Grammatology,“It is therefore not 
too extravagant to say „writing‟ or „différance‟ is the structure that would deconstruct 
structuralism–as indeed it would deconstruct all texts, being, as we shall see, the always 
already differentiated structure of deconstruction” (Spivak, 1976: LIX). What is 
“proved” about reality can only be imagined in terms of points of view. 
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3. Imagine . . .  
 
 Imagine an author without a name? Imagine that the author belongs to a people 
who do not have a concept of time, i.e., do not think in linear terms of the past, present 
and future. What if such an author would write a book, an autobiography, let us assume. 
Throughout the entire book he would refer to himself with the pronoun “I”. Since he is 
not aware of time, his entire autobiography would consist of a bunch of descriptive 
statements–that the grass in his village is green, etc. Whether he says: I eat grass or the 
grass eats me, he still means the same thing, because in the absence of the name as a 
condition of being, the “I” and the “grass” become interchangeable terms:  
 
It is, of course, imaginable that two people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with 
games should sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and 
even with all the appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we 
should say they were playing chess. But now imagine a game of chess translated 
according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate 
with a game–say into yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose those two people to 
yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such 
a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should 
we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What right would one have to say 
so? (Wittgenstein, 1953: 81). 
  
Although there are no rules of name and time in the sense that we imagine the rules as 
prescriptive of identity, the game could still be played. The book can be written, but 
whether it is a book, a self-defined, compact entity open for anyone to find a meaning 
for him or herself, that is something we could talk about only by imposing our rules on 
the tribe. 
 Chomsky would see it differently; whatever is the limitation of their conceptual 
ability as we see it, from a present standpoint, the people of the tribe possess an innate 
linguistic competence. The language-game is secondary to the biological fact that the 
members are born with the game-playing ability. The ability may be defined as a language 
organ that all human beings are equally endowed with. Different individuals may perform 
differently, but this does not affect the basic equation of language with the human 
situation:  
 
So what‟s clear is that there is some biological capacity which differentiates us from 
rocks and birds and apes and so on; it plainly isn‟t just a sensory capacity . . . there is 
some mental characteristic, if you like–something about our nature which reflects itself 
in the structure and growth of a particular mental organ and that constitutes the 
intrinsic, innate contribution to the growth of language (Rieber, 1983: 49). 
 
For Derrida, playing the game would be a strategic means to throwing the essence off 
balance; it is a way of accepting the reality of metaphysics while simultaneously 
overturning reality to make it stand on its feet. The game is played as much as for its 
own sake as with the explicit purpose of criticizing any fundamental concern to discover 
a stable origin or enter an apocalyptic now. Style is not just a means to playing the 
language-game; style is the game; a language-user is above all a stylist; he is a reader 
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without a past or a transcendental purpose in view; like Nietzsche, he writes in order to 
mock; the mockery of essence is the essence of all writing. As Derrida writes regarding 
the hymen that “differs (defers) from the present, or from a present that is past, future, 
or eternal, then its sheet has neither inside nor outside, belongs neither to reality nor to 
the imaginary, neither to the original nor to its representation. The syntax of its fold 
makes it impossible for us to arrest its play or its indecision, to fix it on any one of its 
terms . . .” (Derrida, 1981a: 231). Style is the hymen that both is and is not confusing the 
reader from knowing the truth of the essence or the son knowing the “father” for a fact.  
 
4. Fathers and sons 
 
We act by virtue of what we recognize as beneficial,” observed Bazarov. 
 “At the present time, negation is the most beneficial of all–and we deny–” 
“Everything?” 
“Everything!” (Turgenev, 1941: 55) 
  
Is the Wittgensteinian imagination, where one perpetually opens the mind to possible 
instances, a point of denial of everything, also a point of negation of all authority? The 
history of discourse would be the description of an imaginative account of possibilities. 
One begins theorizing about the world from an apparent state of “nothingness”. As 
Bazarov puts it, here only “personal character” matters (Turgenev, 1941: 54). There is an 
element of rebellion in Wittgenstein, a rebellion against Western metaphysics, against 
philosophy as a quest for wisdom or ultimate reality, or philosophy as theoretical 
counterpart to science. For Wittgenstein, character is the language that transcends any 
discussion on a philosophy of language.  
The aphoristic style of writing is significant to the Western sage; the style is 
meant to influence and bring about a moral change in the listener and have a dramatic 
effect. He does not appeal to a history of philosophy; rather philosophy is means to 
discovering the obvious or commonplace. As Norman Malcolm notes in Wittgenstein. A 
Memoir: “Once when we were together, he (Wittgenstein) made a striking observation 
about philosophy: „A person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in a room 
who wants to get out but doesn‟t know how. He tries the window but it is too high. He 
tries the chimney but it is too narrow. And if he would only turn around, he would see 
that the door has been open all the time!‟” (Malcolm, 1984: 44). It is the metaphorical 
“open door” that consistently has been ignored by philosophers. 
 For Chomsky, it is common people who have historically been ignored by vested 
interests. The open door of philosophy is in a morality of politics connected with the 
supra-institution of the state, which permeates the other institutions of family, church, 
etc. In Chomsky‟s vision of an anarchist society some form of authority is bound to 
exist, an authority that springs from the innateness of individuals and their potential 
competence to be language-users. Experience is not so much a source of language as 
much as evidence to the disclosure of the innate language potential. In historical terms, 
the experience of common people conclusively demonstrates that a human being 
naturally seeks certain form of society free from hunger and oppression, one in which 
their creativity is expressed in a manner compatible with their nature and the social order 
to which they belong. As Chomsky observes in his essay “Language and Freedom”, “it is 
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obvious by introspection that each man possesses a mind, a substance whose essence is 
thought; his creative use of language reflects this freedom of thought and conception” 
(Chomsky, 1987: 145). 
 For Derrida it is not so much the obvious or commonplace as much as the 
undisclosed or the borderline; the open door would perhaps be a metaphor to the 
repressed; the obvious, in fact, is what is concealed as false, illusionary, hysterical, 
woman and child. Deconstruction is an act of unconcealing; it is opening the door; the 
open door is/of writing; writing in turn is a metaphor to the metaphor; it is the undoing 
of the comparison; it is the other at the heart of the metaphor; it is authority without the 
presence of author; reality is a metaphor or a comparison: since the essence is always, 
already not there owing to its state of perpetual displacement.  
In his analysis of Nietzsche‟s “I have forgotten my umbrella,” a very inessential 
statement from a great philosopher, Derrida points out that “There is no infallible way 
of knowing the occasion of this sample or what it could have been later grafted onto. 
We never will know for sure what Nietzsche wanted to say or do when he noted these 
words, nor even that he actually wanted anything” (Derrida, 1978: 123). Did Nietzsche 
have an umbrella or was he imagining one, a new metaphor in the making! The 
metaphor of the umbrella is in turn the reality of philosophy. “Even my admission can 
very well be a lie because there is dissimulation only if one tells the truth (only if one 
tells that one is telling the truth), still the text will remain indefinitely open, cryptic and 
parodying” (Derrida, 1978: 137). 
 Bazarov, in ironic ways, is the paradigm that reconciles the dialogue between 
Wittgenstein, Chomsky and Derrida. He is a deconstructionist in his stance of denying 
everything that he observes before Nikolai Petrovitch. In his negation, Bazarov is a 
stylist above all; scientific reasoning that, according to Bazarov, must lead to a nihilist 
perspective opposing the influence of tradition is a conclusion that he works out 
through language. To Nikolai Petrovitch‟s accusation of nihilism as a form of 
“„materialism‟, „a foreign word again!,‟ broke in Bazarov” (Turgenev, 1941: 57). In an 
earlier instance, Bazarov is “displeased” with Arkady‟s use of the word “personal 
egoism” to refer to some kind of a self-interest because “there was a flavor of 
philosophy, that is to say, romanticism about it, for Bazarov called philosophy, too, 
romanticism” (Turgenev, 1941: 56). 
 The above statement can be read in two ways: one is that Bazarov is attacking 
the voices in Western philosophy: the entire self-perpetuating discourse that exists for its 
own sake. As Bazarov exclaims in a rhetorical outburst of passion: 
 
Then we suspected that talk, perpetual talk, and nothing but talk, about our social 
diseases, was not worth while, that it all led to nothing but superficiality and pedantry; 
we saw that our leading men, so-called advanced people and reformers, are no good; 
that we busy ourselves over foolery, talk rubbish about art, unconscious creativeness, 
parliamentarism, trial by jury, and the deuce knows what all; all the while, all the while, 
it‟s a question of getting bread to eat, while we‟re stifling under the grossest superstition, 
while all our enterprises come to grief, simply because there aren‟t honest men enough 
to carry them on, while the very emancipation our Government‟s busy upon will hardly 
come to any good, because peasants are glad to rob themselves to get drunk at the gin-
shop (Turgenev, 1941: 57-58). 
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Another facet to the same point would be that Bazarov is attempting to write in 
a simple language (an alternate discourse); a Wittgensteinian project of writing to 
describe rather than philosophize; and in the process filter the existing language of much 
that is useless, i.e., the romanticism of philosophy. The “romanticism” facet has a 
double reading in the case of Chomsky. One is an indubitable Bazarovian contempt for 
authority in any form of state-controlled discourse; another, is the romantic aura that 
surrounds libertarian socialism in the notion of an anarchist society free of the state, an 
egalitarian social order and the idea of connecting that order to a theory of human 
nature. If everything can be rejected because it carries the weight of authority, what then 
constitutes action or in Ivan Karamazov‟s/Sartre‟s terms why should one be good? 
 
5. Numbers/words 
 
 Language is relative; morality is absolute; but it is absolute from a point wherein 
a person can understand his or her relativity in terms of the rest of the universe. That is 
the Wittgensteinean paradox that while contradiction is possible in language, morality 
transcends contradiction. Faith translates the universe from a rational order of things 
with or without an end in view to a poetic state of unreason, where things become, in spite 
of themselves and language responds to this becoming with a transcendent logic. In its 
openness and simultaneous undermining of essence, poetry as art form anticipates 
philosophy as discourse. Borges in his “Argumentum Ornithologicum” in an interesting 
way plays on this poetry of philosophy: 
 
I close my eyes and see a flock of birds. The vision lasts a second or perhaps less; I 
don‟t know how many birds I saw. Were they a definite or an indefinite number? This 
problem involves the question of the existence of God. If God exists, the number is 
definite, because how many birds I saw is known to God. If God does not exist, the 
number is indefinite, because nobody was able to take count. In this case, I saw fewer 
than ten birds (let‟s say) and more than one; but not nine, eight, seven, six, five, etc. 
That number, as a whole number, is inconceivable; ergo, God exists (Borges, 1964: 29). 
  
If an argument is a scientific means of exposition leading to quantifiable results, then the 
argumentum is conspicuous by its absence of one. Apparently it is a piece of intellectual 
prose operating within the discourse of a poem, if we see a poem as being an argument 
without an essence or only a surreal one. The prose-poem can be paraphrased: “To 
believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter” 
(Wittgenstein, 1969: 74). Borges‟ attempt to philosophize is a mockery of philosophy as 
a discourse of possession, God or numbers or words, without ceasing to see “the facts 
of the world” as an “end of the matter”. It could probably be a flock of birds, which can 
or cannot be counted, whose number is indefinite or definite, but comprising an 
argument.    
 Why is the vision (with the eyes closed) any different from reality? If possession 
is a way of securing identity, and identity structured around a set of dominant values, 
reality could only be an adjunct to the vision that deviates from identity; and philosophy 
an extension of poetry, since “Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of 
puzzlement” (Wittgenstein, 1980: 1). A vision of birds is an instinctual occurrence and 
not a puzzle that can be unraveled through reasoning in a sequential manner. The world 
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is not constructed on identity because it is not built on possession, since the world is the 
world. As Wittgenstein sees it, “Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That 
what exists does exist” (Wittgenstein, 1969: 86). 
 In Chomskyean terms, private property is the essence of the state that in an 
anarchist society would undergo transformation with social welfare as end in view. The 
function of language as an intrinsic aspect of the mind is realization of an anarchist 
society. Social transformation is the essence of language. The anarchist is a visionary like 
the poet and a Platonist who visualizes the good as the metaphorical sun. Since it is a 
metaphor of the eye or the mind, the mind is ideally speaking competence itself.  
 
A vision of the future social order is in turn based on a concept of human nature. If in 
fact humans are indefinitely malleable, completely plastic beings, with no innate 
structures of mind and no intrinsic needs of a cultural or social character, then they are 
fit subjects for the „shaping of behavior‟ by the state authority, the corporate manager, 
the technocrat, or the central committee. Those with some confidence in the human 
species will hope this is not so and will try to determine the intrinsic human 
characteristics that provide the framework for intellectual development, the growth of 
moral consciousness, cultural achievement, and participation in a free community 
(Chomsky, 1987: 154).   
  
For Derrida, Borges‟ prose-poem offers a brilliant instance of deconstruction of 
authority; while “count” is an aspect of numbers, in/definiteness belongs to the realm of 
words. Numbers and words are sign-systems that exist in a state of différance. They do not 
oppose one another as much as displace any attempt to fix them as indisputable entities 
going by the Saussurean view that “the arbitrary nature of the sign is really what protects 
language from any attempt to modify it . . . language is a system of arbitrary signs and 
lacks the necessary basis, the solid ground for discussion” (Saussure, 1966: 73). The very 
basis of the discussion number/words functions on the deconstruction of the sign (/)–is 
it “or,” or “and,” or even nothing that can be varyingly interpreted depending on the 
context in view. As Derrida defines in his essay “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, “the 
fundamental property of writing, in a difficult sense of the word as spacing: diastem and 
time becoming space . . . The border between the non-phonetic space of writing (even 
“phonetic” writing) and the space of the stage (scene) of dreams is uncertain” (Derrida, 
1976: 217). Deconstruction as spacing, in the sense of being in a transitional state between 
the sign on the page and the stage of the dream, is real in the difference it makes to the 
reader but also a dream (rather than an illusion) in escaping the grasp of meaning.   
 
6. Ciding the author 
 
“I don‟t know which one of the two of us is writing this page” 
– “Borges and I” – (Borges, 1967: 200) 
  
Between the name Borges and the pronoun “I,” there could be Wittgenstein, Chomsky, 
Derrida, Ivan, Sartre, Dostoyevsky, Bazarov, Turgenev, Boswell or Dr. Johnson, the 
writer or “you”, anybody or/and nobody. To the question “who is an author?” 
Wittgenstein‟s characteristic reply might be – a latent possibility that comes into being in 
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order to realize the world. “Authority” is a state that the world imposes upon the writer. 
In the use of language, the writer translates phenomena into his/her world. To 
acknowledge the occurrence of this translation is to negate authority. The fundamental 
question of phenomena becoming language is both a useless one and one that cannot be 
answered except in metaphysical terms. “As a part of the system of language, one may 
say, the sentence has life. But one is tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence 
life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever 
accompanied it would for us just be another sign” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 5). This is 
because, in Ivan Karamazov‟s terms, it is only an “idea” and ideas exist beyond the 
realm of individual language-users. Authority is the possession of an idea and 
understanding happens when the world interacts with words. As Dr. Johnson sees it, 
there is a rock outside the text, which to Wittgenstein would be a possibility realizable in 
language. Whether there is an im-possibility outside the world or language that 
determines or oversees the movement of language and the world, an understanding that 
surpasses words, it would be an extraordinarily poetic situation, since one can never 
know for certain which of the two of them/us is writing the page. 
 Borges says in “Poem written in a copy of Beowulf”: “Beyond my anxiety, 
beyond this writing/ the universe waits, inexhaustible, inviting” (Borges, 1967: 202). 
Borges‟ problem is not so much of whether language makes sense to the universe as 
much as it is whether the universe could be understood through language. To 
Wittgenstein, language is the only possible system through which the universe makes 
itself known; this does not mean denying the presence of the rock; the rock is there 
outside of the text; but the question is how do we know that it is there? “A blind man 
could easily find out if I am blind too; by, for example, making a certain gesture with his 
hand, and asking me what he did . . . knowing is not a psychological state whose special 
characteristics will explain all kinds of things” (Wittgenstein, 1956: 63). While Dr. 
Johnson‟s forceful kick in a simplistic way encounters Berkeley‟s idealism, the episode 
illustrates the very reductionism involved in the question of knowing the world either 
ideally or empirically. Science and mysticism coincide at this point of marriage between 
language and the universe, where one becomes possible to the other. 
 As Wittgenstein points out: “We feel that even when all possible scientific 
questions have been answered, the problems of life remains completely untouched. Of 
course there are no questions left, and this itself is the answer” (Wittgenstein, 1961: 73). 
From the point of view of science and philosophy, Wittgenstein brings the 
question/answer method into the purview of religion and mysticism. The result is not a 
science of religion based on a different gospel other than the scientific method, but 
rather, to show the limitation under which science operates, when seen from the eyes of 
a language-theorist.  
 For Chomsky, questions could be posed and possible answers be derived on 
further reasoning. The traditional scientific method has not completely exhausted its 
reserves and, in fact, its area can be broadened to include human affairs as well. The 
study of language is not just about how we use it, but also an examination of the origin 
and the scientific basis of the use. The totalities that Wittgenstein attempts to see in 
terms of mysticism outside the human body, Chomsky deals with in scientific terms of 
the human body. The „I‟ is not a mere language-user but an individual materially 
endowed with a system that makes articulation a reality.  
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The study of language falls naturally within human biology. The language faculty, which 
somehow evolved in human prehistory, makes possible the amazing feat of language 
learning... it makes possible the coherent and creative use of language in ways that we 
can sometimes describe, but hardly even begin to understand (Chomsky, 1975: 123).  
 
The Derridean position steers clear of either Wittgensteinean totalities or the 
Chomskyean premise basing itself in a biological LAD. Though the question-answer 
method tends to be the basis of a scientific theology (a dogmatic view of science) that as 
a source of authority is metaphysical in its own right; it is questionableness (that there is 
nothing beyond question –language as a question; the question of the text; the question 
as opposed to the quest for origins) that is a way of “ciding” the author with only traces 
of the murder for the detection of the reader, “The trace of this wounded writing that 
bears the stigmata of its own proper inadequation: signed, assumed, chained . . . ” 
(Derrida, 1995: 61).   
 
7. Ideas, rocks and bread 
 
Does philosophy trace its authority to an identifiable source–ideas, rocks (or tables) or 
something as mundane as bread itself? If knowledge is based on authority and the 
author makes knowledge a legitimate discourse, the point is whether there is an alternate 
discourse to knowledge (knowing as a mode of cognizing the world?). To a man who is 
hungry the reason to be is to relieve hunger. How does a new-born child know that she‟s 
hungry unless there is a language-mechanism operating between hunger as essential 
quality and the word “hunger”, rather, cry, that makes knowledge possible? Or is 
hungering an interpretation of the cry? Does explanation make language natural to 
human body or is it one among other responses to the definition of knowledge? What is 
certain to be known? Is the rock a phallic symbol erect and sure of itself? Is language 
matter or pure sensuousness? Are there two languages operating simultaneously–one, 
the language of commonplace and another, the scientific language that is another 
version of the Platonic ideas)? Is metaphysics as useless as science?  
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